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n January 1999, eleven European countries abandoned their respective
national currencies and monetary independence to adopt a common cur-




of data available, we can begin to learn from Europe’s natural experiment.
In a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the equilibrium adjustment in the rel-
ative price across countries associated with a given country-speciﬁc shock
results both from movements in nominal prices and from movements in the
relative price of the countries’ currencies, i.e., the nominal exchange rate.
In a currency union, movements in the nominal exchange rate are, by deﬁ-
nition, no longer possible, and equilibrium adjustments in the relative price
across countries result only from movements in nominal prices.2 In addition,
countries in a currency union can no longer use monetary policy in response
to such a shock. The equilibrium adjustment of nominal prices associated
with a given country-speciﬁc shock reﬂects, among other factors, not only the
degree of asymmetry of the shock but also the degree of integration of the
different regions (namely, the mobility of factors of production or the ability
The author would like to thank Andreas Hornstein, Thomas Humphrey, Roy Webb, and
Alexander Wolman for helpful comments. This article does not necessarily represent the views
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 These countries were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece adopted the Euro in January 2001. Monetary
policy in the Euro area has been conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) since 1999.
The remaining three members of the European Union (Denmark, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) have, so far, decided to maintain their own currencies and monetary independence.
2 For example, as will be seen later, in response to faster productivity growth in its traded-
goods sector (than in the other sectors), a country will experience a real exchange rate appreciation
(an increase in its relative price), which in a currency union translates into higher inﬂation.
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to automatically transfer resources across regions). The more asymmetric
the shock or the less integrated the different regions in a currency union, the
bigger the equilibrium adjustment associated with a given shock. Hence, in-
ﬂationdifferentialscanbeseenasanindicatorofregionalasymmetrieswithin
a currency union.3
In this article I document the behavior of inﬂation dispersion and inﬂation
differentials in Euro-area countries before and after the introduction of the
Euro. This documentation supports the main message of the article: that in-
ﬂation dispersion and inﬂation differentials (with respect to German inﬂation)
within the Euro area have increased after the adoption of the common cur-
rency. Moreover,inﬂationdispersionintheEuroareahasbeenhigherthanthat
observed in the United States. Assessing the sources of inﬂation divergence
in the Euro area after 1999 suggests that countries with higher inﬂation rates
tend to have also had higher GDP growth rates and a lower price level when
the Euro was adopted. Finally, the variability of the inﬂation differential with
respect to German inﬂation has tended to increase for most countries after the
Euro was adopted.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 1 I brieﬂy review the pro-
cess leading to the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
In Section 2 I provide a general discussion about currency unions, and in
Section 3 I document the behavior of inﬂation before and after the Euro was
adopted using twelve-month core CPI inﬂation data from the eleven countries
that adopted the common currency in January 1999. In the ﬁnal section I state
my conclusions.
1. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE ROAD TO THE EMU
The process of European integration started shortly afterWorldWar II, stimu-
latedbytheideathatauniﬁedEuropewouldhelpensurepeace. In1950Robert
Schuman,France’sforeignminister,proposedthatthecoalandsteelindustries
of France and Germany (then West Germany) be coordinated under a single
supranational authority. This initiative lead to the European Steel and Coal
Community, formed in 1952 together with Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. Building on the success of this organization, the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were
established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. These three organizations were
later consolidated in 1967 to form the European Community (EC), known as
European Union (EU) since the ratiﬁcation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
3 This discussion is closely related to that of optimal currency areas. The theory of optimal
currency areas dates back to Mundell (1961), but it gained renewed interest in the last decade
with the European project for a currency union. This theory stresses the relative importance of
internal factor mobility and external factor immobility in deﬁning the appropriate domain for a
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As the Bretton Woods system became less stable during the 1960s, the
EuropeanCouncildecidedinDecember1969topursuethegoalofestablishing
an economic and monetary union in Europe by 1980.4 A three-phase plan
designed by Pierre Werner (then prime minister of Luxembourg) to achieve
economic and monetary union within ten years was approved in March 1971,
and the ﬁrst stage, involving the narrowing of currency ﬂuctuation margins,
was launched. However, the instability in foreign exchange markets in 1971
and the subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system effectively brought
the EMU project to a stop until the end of the decade.
In a new effort to establish an area of monetary stability, the European
Monetary System (EMS) was created in March 1979.5 The EMS allowed
(initially) for currency ﬂuctuations in a ± 2.25 percent range around ﬁxed
bilateral rates, and it effectively reduced exchange rate volatility among the
participating currencies. It wasn’t until 1988, however, that a new effort to
establish a monetary union was made when the Hanover European Council
commissioned a report to Jacques Delors (then president of the European
Commission) on the implementation of a monetary union. The resulting De-
lors Report laid out a three-stage plan for the implementation of a monetary
union, culminating with the creation of a single currency. The ﬁrst stage of
this process began in July 1990 and was marked by the dismantling of internal
barriers to the free movement of capital.
In February 1992 the European Council signed the Maastricht Treaty,
formally establishing the blueprint for economic and monetary integration in
Europe. Itdeﬁnedtheprecisetimelineforthethreestagesleadingtomonetary
union and set out the convergence criteria that member states had to pass in
order to be eligible to adopt the common currency (the EMU’s ﬁnal stage).
The ﬁrst stage of the EMU project, already in place, ended in December
1993. The second stage then began with the establishment of the European
Monetary Institute (which would later become the European Central Bank—
ECB). Its role was to strengthen the coordination of monetary policies among
member states and to make the preparations required for a single monetary
policy and currency.
TheMaastrichtTreatylaidoutﬁveconvergencecriteriathatmemberstates
had to meet in order to enter into the EMU’s ﬁnal stage. These criteria were
(1) public budget deﬁcit below 3 percent of GDP; (2) public debt less than 60
percent of GDP; (3) inﬂation rate within 1.5 percent of the three EU countries
with the lowest rates; (4) long-term interest rates within 2 percent of the three
4 The European Council is composed primarily of the president of the European Commission
(the executive body of the EU) and the heads of government of the member states and their
foreign ministers.
5 The participating countries in the EMS were the six countries that formed the EC since its
inception, plus Denmark and Ireland (which joined the EC in 1973). The United Kingdom also
joined the EC at this date but opted not to participate in the EMS.56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
lowest interest rates in the EU; and (5) no nominal exchange rate movements
outside the EMS’s margins for two years. These convergence criteria, which
imposed strict ﬁscal rules and required inﬂation and nominal interest rates to
converge across Europe, conditioned the conduct of both monetary and ﬁscal
policyintheEUcountriesbeforetheactualadoptionofthecommoncurrency.
Inthespringof1998theEuropeanCouncilannouncedtheelevencountries
that would enter the EMU’s third stage as well as the irrevocable conversion
ratesbetweentheEuroandeachparticipatingcurrency.6 Thethirdstagestarted
in January 1999 with the introduction of the Euro as a medium of account.
Euro banknotes and coins were put in circulation in 2002.
With the start of the EMU’s third stage, member countries abandoned
their monetary independence, and monetary policy came under the control of
the ECB. Its goal is to maintain medium-term price stability in the Euro area,
deﬁnedasayear-on-yearincreaseintheharmonizedindexofconsumerprices
(HICP) below 2 percent.7 With the start of the third stage, member countries
also committed to the ﬁscal rules set by the Stability and Growth Pact. This
pactestablishesalimitof3percentofGDPforbudgetdeﬁcits, anditcommits
member countries to aim in the medium term for budgets that are close to
balance or in surplus.8
SeveralcountriesmayjointheEMUinthenextfewyears. Inonegroupare
thethreeEUmemberstatesstillpendingpoliticalapprovalintheircountriesto
join the EMU: Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Another group
includes the countries that are candidates to join the EU in 2004 and are
required to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. These countries are the
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia.
2. CURRENCY UNIONSAND INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Currency Union
In a currency union, different countries or regions share a common currency.
Theissuanceofthecommoncurrencyandtheconductofmonetarypolicyisthe
6 Of the remaining four EU member countries not entering the Euro zone in 1999, Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom chose not to participate, while Greece was viewed, at this stage,
as not having fulﬁlled the necessary conditions for the adoption of the Euro.
7 The HICP is the weighted arithmetic average of the consumer price indices for the Euro-area
countries. The weight of each country is its share of private domestic consumption expenditure in
the Euro area.
See Svensson (2002) for a critical evaluation of European monetary-policy strategy.
8 The Stability and Growth Pact also deﬁnes the exceptional conditions under which breaching
the 3 percent budget deﬁcit limit can be accepted and establishes how and when ﬁnes can be levied
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responsibilityofacentralmonetaryauthority.9 Thisinstitutionalarrangement
characterizes, for example, the states that form the United States and the
countries that form the EMU; the authorities responsible for monetary policy
are the Federal Reserve System and the ECB, respectively.
The central bank of a currency union holds assets which may include
interest-bearinginstrumentsissuedbythegovernmentsofthedifferentregions
(or countries) or by the federal government, and its liabilities consist of the
monetary base for the whole area. The monetary authority adjusts the money
supplythroughthepurchaseandsaleofinterest-bearingassets. Notethatsince
the member countries share a common currency, interest-rate parity implies
thatthenominalinterestrate(onassetswithsimilarcharacteristics)isthesame
across countries in a currency union. The joint central bank earns seigniorage
revenue from issuing the common currency, and this revenue can be freely
allocated across countries.10
Incontrasttomonetarypolicy(whichisdecidedatthecentrallevel),ﬁscal
policy is under the control of a member state or country in a currency union.
That is, member states or countries maintain a ﬁscal authority, responsible for
the conduct of ﬁscal policy in their region. This fact does not preclude the
existence of a central ﬁscal authority as well. This is the case, for example,
in the United States, where ﬁscal policy at the federal level involves a large
amount of resources. In Europe, the resources involved in ﬁscal policy at the
central level are very small.




in the order of 7 or 8 percent for quarterly data.12 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)
computethewelfarecostofexchangeratevariabilityinanexplicitlystochastic
version of the “new open-economy macroeconomics” framework.13 In this
context,theyconsideramonetaryregimechangethateliminatesexchangerate
variability (by pegging the exchange rate) while maintaining the variance of
9 I am restricting attention to arrangements in which a group of countries (or regions) shares
a common currency and monetary policy is decided by a joint central bank. I am, therefore,
abstracting from arrangements in which a country (typically small) adopts the currency of a large
anchor country.
10 Sibert (1994) considers the problem of allocating seigniorage in a currency union.
11 The European Commission estimated that costs of currency conversion in the European
Union amount to 0.4 percent of the area’s GDP.
12 See, for example, the data presented in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).
13 The “new open-economy macroeconomics” framework was set forth by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995), and it represents an important workhorse model in international economics. This
model introduces nominal rigidities into a two-country general equilibrium model.58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
world monetary growth constant. For their parameterization, which assumes
a low degree of risk aversion, the cost of exchange rate variability is about
1 percent of GDP. This calculation suggests that the welfare losses due to
exchangeratemovementsgeneratedbymonetaryshocksalonecouldbelarge.
Furthermore, it reﬂects only the beneﬁts of eliminating exchange rate risk,
that is, of ﬁxing the exchange rate. Adopting a common currency, however,
is understood to have other implications, such as deeper market integration,
which may entail additional beneﬁts that are beyond the scope of the model
in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002).
An increase in trade volume is typically stressed as an important impli-
cation of reduced costs of currency conversion and the absence of nominal
exchange rate risk. Several recent empirical studies have investigated the
relationship between currency unions and trade. These studies offer a wide
range of estimates of the effect of the currency union on trade and suggest
that belonging to a currency union/board may lead to an increase in trade with
other members by as much as a factor of three. Among these studies, Rose
and van Wincoop (2001) estimate that the Euro may lead to an increase in
trade in the Euro area of about 50 percent.14
By joining a currency area, however, a country forgoes the ability to use
monetary policy to respond to region-speciﬁc macroeconomic disturbances.
The inability to use monetary policy in response to asymmetric shocks can
be an important cost of joining a currency union, particularly if asymmetric
shocks represent an important source of output ﬂuctuations and if adjustment
mechanisms across regions to these shocks are absent. One such margin
of adjustment across regions is provided by factor mobility, which allows
factors of production to be easily reallocated in response to regional shocks.
Another margin of adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks across regions is the
automatic stabilization provided by sizeable transfer programs administered
attheunionlevel. Thefederalincometaxandunemploymentinsurance,which
automatically transfer resources from booming regions to those in recession,
are examples of such programs administered at the federal level in the United
States. Europe differs considerably from the United States along these two
dimensions: despite the elimination of barriers to the movement of factors,
labormobilitywithinEuropeisstilllowerthanintheUnitedStates,andunlike
the United States, Europe lacks a sizeable system of transfers among states.
Finally, countries in a currency union may also incur strategic and political
costsindeterminingtheallocationofseigniorageandtheconductofmonetary
policy.
14 See Rose (2002) for a review of this literature and for a complete list of references. This
paper, in particular, uses meta-analysis for evaluating and combining the disparate estimates from
different studies. He ﬁnds that the combined estimate implies that a currency union approximately
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Price Level Divergence in a Currency Union
Countries in a monetary union share the same currency but need not have
the same price level: different regions within the union may have different
price levels and experience different inﬂation rates.15 The United States, a
long-established currency union, provides a benchmark for the magnitude of
price differentials in a currency union. Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2002)
use consumer price data for nineteen U.S. cities from 1918 to 1995 and ﬁnd
that price level divergences across U.S. cities are large and persistent: annual
inﬂation rates measured over ten-year periods can differ by as much as 1.55
percentage points. Parsley andWei (1996) use commodity level price data for
forty-eight U.S. cities from 1975 to 1992 and ﬁnd persistent deviations from
the law of one price for both traded and nontraded goods.16 They also ﬁnd
thatconvergenceratesfortradedcategoriesarehigherthanthoseofnontraded
goods or those found in cross-country data.
Deviations in the price level across regions within a currency union can
arise from two sources. The ﬁrst source is deviations from the law of one
price for traded goods across regions. The second source is deviations in the
relative price of nontraded goods across regions.
Let us consider a currency union with two regions, A and B, and assume
that the price index in each region is given by a geometric weighted average
of traded- and nontraded-goods prices:
pi,t = αpN
i,t + (1 − α)pT
i,t, i = A,B,






is the log of the traded-
(nontraded-) goods price index, and α is the share of nontraded goods in
the price index.17 Clearly, asymmetric shocks within a currency union, with
distinct effects on the price index of traded or nontraded goods (pT or pN)
across regions, will generate a differential in the price level across countries
and an inﬂation differential.18
One such asymmetric shock is the following. If a country experiences
faster productivity growth in the sectors producing traded goods (relative to
15 Much of the existing literature on monetary unions associates a common currency with
a common price level. See, for example, Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) or Bergin (2000). In
contrast, Bergin (2002) and Duarte and Wolman (2002) model currency unions allowing consumer
price levels to differ across regions.
16 The law of one price states that, absent trade barriers, a commodity should sell for the
same price (when expressed in the same currency) everywhere.
17 Of course, if the weight α differs across regions, then the price level will also differ across
regions due to the difference in composition of the indices (even if pN and pT are identical across
regions).
18 Denoting the inﬂation rate in period t, the percentage change in the price level from t −1
to t,a sπt, it follows that the inﬂation differential can be approximated by a weighted average
of the inﬂation differential in traded- and nontraded-goods indices:
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thesectorsproducingnontradedgoods)thantheothercountriesinthecurrency
union, then this country will experience higher inﬂation than the other coun-
tries. Toseethis, notethatapositiveshocktoproductivityinthetraded-goods




a higher relative price of nontraded goods in this country raises this country’s
pricelevelrelativetothatabroad. Theinﬂationdifferentialassociatedwiththe
shocktoproductivityinthetraded-goodssectorisanequilibriumphenomenon
and will persist while productivity differentials persist across countries. An
inﬂationdifferentialgeneratedinthiswayisknownastheBalassa-Samuelson
effect.19
At the inception of a currency union, another source of inﬂation differen-
tials is price level convergence. If price levels differ initially across countries,
then adopting a common currency will lead prices to converge (at least to
some extent), generating temporary inﬂation differentials across countries.
Price level convergence can occur for both traded and nontraded goods.
For traded goods, increased market integration and price transparency
associated with the adoption of a common currency reduces the scope for
deviations from the law of one price, leading to temporary inﬂation differen-
tials for traded-goods price indices.20 As for the price of nontraded goods, the
Balassa-Samuelsonhypothesisalsosuggeststhatadoptingacommoncurrency
narrows deviations in the price for these goods across countries. To see this,
note that in a currency union, economic integration creates pressure for con-
vergence in productivity levels. Since tradable goods tend to be more capital
intensive than nontraded goods, the scope for productivity differentials across
countries in the nontraded-goods sector tends to be limited relative to that in
the traded-goods sector. Therefore, countries with initially low productivity
levels(whichtendtobepoorerandhavelowerpricelevels)tendtoexperience
higher productivity growth in the tradable-goods sector as a result of conver-
gence in productivity. As we have seen before, prices of nontraded goods in
the countries with lower price levels tend to increase, converging to the higher
price level of wealthier countries.21
19 See, for example, Chapter 4 in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) on the Balassa-Samuelson
effect.
20 The ECB Monthly Bulletin (October 1999), for example, provides strong evidence for the
convergence of car prices across Euro-area countries.
21 Natalucci and Ravenna (2002) analyze the choice of the exchange rate regime for accession
countries to the EMU when these countries need to meet both inﬂation and nominal exchange rate
criteria but are experiencing a real exchange rate appreciation due to increased productivity in the
tradable-goods sector (the Balassa-Samuelson effect).M. Duarte: Inﬂation Divergence in Europe 61
Figure 1 Monthly Core CPI Inﬂation
3. THEADOPTION OF THE EUROAND THE BEHAVIOR OF
INFLATION
In this section I document the recent behavior of inﬂation in Euro-area coun-
tries. The measure of inﬂation I use is the twelve-month percentage change
of the core consumer price index (CPI) for each of the eleven countries that
adoptedtheEuroin1999,atamonthlyfrequency.22 Thatis,inﬂationinmonth










Figure 1 depicts the monthly core consumer price inﬂation for a subset
of Euro-area countries. Consumer price inﬂation declined steadily during
the second half of the 1990s but has recently started to rise throughout the
Euro zone. In the beginning of 1999, the twelve-month inﬂation rate in most
countrieswasbelowtheECB’smedium-termpricestabilitytargetof2percent;
thisratewasabovethislevelonlyinPortugalandSpain(2.5percent). Bymid-
2002, the overall picture was quite different. Except for Germany and France,
22 Core consumer price indices exclude food and energy prices, which are considered the
most erratic components of price indices. The data are taken from Eurostat.
I have not included data for Greece, which adopted the Euro in January 2001.62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Euro-Area Inﬂation Dispersion: Absolute Spread and
Standard Deviation
all Euro-zone countries were above the 2 percent target. The twelve-month
core CPI inﬂation rate in June 2002 was 5.3 percent in Ireland, 4.5 percent in
Portugal, and 3.9 percent in the Netherlands and Spain, for example.
I now turn to the behavior of inﬂation dispersion in the Euro area in this
period. Figure 2 plots two summary statistics for the dispersion of inﬂation:
the absolute difference between the highest and lowest inﬂation rates and the
(unweighted) standard deviation of inﬂation rates across the Euro area from
1996:1 to 2002:12. The absolute spread decreased sharply during the second
half of the 1990s, from about 4 percentage points to about 2 percentage points
by the end of the decade, as the EU member countries aimed at fulﬁlling the
convergence criteria deﬁned by the Maastricht Treaty. The absolute spread
has increased since then to nearly its level at the beginning of the sample
(the average absolute spread in 2002 was 3.8 percentage points). The graph
also shows a decrease in the standard deviation of inﬂation rates across the
Euroareabeforethecommoncurrencywasadoptedfollowedbyasubsequent
increase. In 2002, the standard deviation averaged 1.2 percent, while in 1998
it averaged 0.6 percent.M. Duarte: Inﬂation Divergence in Europe 63
Figure 3 U.S. Inﬂation Dispersion: Absolute Spread and Standard
Deviation
The United States constitutes a long-established currency union, and data
on U.S. inﬂation dispersion provide a natural benchmark against which to
comparetherecentincreaseininﬂationdispersioninEuropedepictedinFigure
2. There is, however, relatively little data on U.S. subnational inﬂation rates.
InordertocompareinﬂationdispersionintheEuroareawiththatintheUnited
States, I use annual data on consumer price levels in nineteen U.S. cities from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 3 plots the two measures of inﬂation dispersion for the United
States from 1950 to 2001. The average absolute spread was 2.8 percent-
age points in the entire sample and 2.2 percentage points in the last decade.
The average standard deviation was 0.8 and 0.6 in these two periods, respec-
tively.23 Comparing the dispersion of inﬂation rates in the Euro area with
that observed among U.S. cities indicates that the former resembled the latter
in the late 1990s. Notwithstanding the existence of some episodes of high
23 Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora (2002) study the dynamics of these price indices for U.S.
cities. They estimate that price index divergences across U.S. cities are temporary but surprisingly
persistent, with a half-life of nearly nine years.64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Absolute Inﬂation Differentials Relative to Germany
inﬂation dispersion in the United States, the two measures of Euro-area in-
ﬂation dispersion are currently higher than the corresponding U.S. sample
averages.24
I now turn from these two summary statistics of inﬂation dispersion to the
distribution of inﬂation differentials with respect to the German inﬂation rate
across the Euro area. The choice of Germany as the reference country reﬂects
the fact that, prior to the adoption of the Euro, the German monetary authority
had a strong reputation for advocating low inﬂation and that its inﬂation rate
has been relatively ﬂat throughout the period considered (Figure 1). Focusing
on the distribution of inﬂation differentials allows some insight into the nature
of these differentials.
Figure4plotstheinﬂationdifferentialwithrespecttoGermaninﬂationfor
a subset of Euro-zone countries, and Figure 5 plots the average inﬂation dif-
ferential with respect to German inﬂation for each Euro-area member country
before and after the adoption of the Euro. The former period averages inﬂa-
tion data from 1996 through 1998, and the latter period averages inﬂation data
from 2000 onwards. I have not included the twelve data points for 1999 since
24 In comparing Figures 2 and 3, the distinct time samples as well as the distinct frequency
of the data should be noted. Using annual (instead of monthly) frequency data for the EMU
countries leads to the same conclusion.M. Duarte: Inﬂation Divergence in Europe 65
Figure 5 Average Inﬂation Differentials (percentage points)
the twelve-month percentage change of consumer price indices for these data
pointseffectivelycoverboththeperiodbeforeandaftertheEurowasadopted.
It is apparent from these two ﬁgures that inﬂation differentials within the
Euro area have increased after the adoption of the common currency for most
countries, reinforcing the message from Figure 2. Over the period before
the Euro was adopted (1996 to 1998), average inﬂation differentials ranged
from 0.3 (Austria) to 1.7 (Italy) percentage points. Inﬂation differentials have
increased steadily across the Euro since after 1999, and over the period from
2000to2002theyrangedfrom0.4(France)tomorethan3(Ireland)percentage
points.
Assessing the sources of the inﬂation differentials observed in the Euro
area after 1999 is a complicated task. Drawing upon the discussion in the
previoussection,Ibrieﬂylookatthejointbehaviorofinﬂationwiththegrowth
rate of output and initial price levels.
As I pointed out in the previous section, price level convergence can be
a source of inﬂation differentials when different countries with initial distinct
pricelevelsadoptacommoncurrency.25 Thisargumentsuggeststhatcountries
25 The ECB has emphasized price level convergence as an important source of inﬂation dif-
ferentials in the Euro area. See, for example, the ECB Monthly Bulletin (October 1999).66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 6 Initial Price Levels andAverage Inﬂation Rate
withlowerpricelevelswouldexhibithigherinﬂationratesthancountrieswith
higher price levels. I use the comparative price levels from the OECD for
January 1999 as a measure of the initial differences in price levels among the
countries in the Euro zone. Figure 6 plots the average inﬂation rate after 2000
against the comparative price level in 1999 for each country in the Euro area.
The plot shows a negative relationship between the price level and subsequent
inﬂation rates (the correlation coefﬁcient is −0.6).26 This evidence suggests
that price level convergence may be a partial explanation for the different
behavior of inﬂation across Euro-zone countries. The process of price level
convergence,however,isatemporaryone,andithasbeenunderwayinEurope
throughout the 1990s.27 This fact suggests a reduced scope for future price
level convergence in Europe.
26 Comparative price levels, a measure of the differences in price levels between countries,
are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
27 See Rogers (2001) for evidence on price level convergence in Europe during the 1990s. He
concludes that while price level convergence contributed to observed inﬂation differentials within
the Euro area in 2000, other forces explain most of those cross-country differences in inﬂation.M. Duarte: Inﬂation Divergence in Europe 67
Figure 7 Average Inﬂation Rates and GDP Growth RatesAfter 1999
Figure7plotstheaverageinﬂationrateaftertheEurowasadoptedineach
Euro-zone country against its average growth rate of GDP in the same period.
Thisﬁgureclearlysuggestsapositiverelationshipbetweentheaveragegrowth
rate of output and average inﬂation after the common currency was adopted.
This ﬁgure suggests that, reﬂecting the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the
observed inﬂation differentials could be indicative of a process of the conver-
gence of productivity levels (driving income convergence) across countries
as well as asymmetric shocks across countries (and desynchronized business
cycles).
Finally, in Figure 8, I plot the variance of twelve-month inﬂation in the
periods before and after the adoption of the Euro, as deﬁned before. This
ﬁgure shows a tendency for increased inﬂation variability after the adoption
of the Euro relative to the previous period. The variance of inﬂation increased
in the later period for seven out of the eleven countries considered. The most
signiﬁcant exception is Italy, where the variance of inﬂation was substantially
smaller after the Euro was adopted.
The Maastricht criteria forced the potential entrants in the EMU to attain
inﬂationconvergenceby1998,arequirementthatconditionedthesecountries’
use of monetary and ﬁscal policy throughout the 1990s. With the start of the68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Variance of Inﬂation
EMU, the restriction on inﬂation convergence was eliminated and the ECB
took control of monetary policy in the Euro area. The ﬁgures above suggest
thattheinabilitytousemonetarypolicyinresponsetocountry-speciﬁcshocks
aftertherequirementthatcountriesattaininﬂationconvergencewaseliminated
is associated with an increase of inﬂation dispersion and volatility.
In the new European institutional framework, regional ﬁscal policy is
the only instrument available to the regional authorities to affect regional
inﬂation. Shouldaregionalﬁscalauthoritydecidetouseﬁscalpolicytoaffect
its inﬂation rate, it raises the question of the effectiveness and implications of
such policy.28
4. CONCLUSION
In this article I document the behavior of inﬂation dispersion and inﬂation dif-
ferentials in Euro-area countries before and after the Euro was introduced. In-
ﬂation dispersion and inﬂation differentials (with respect to German inﬂation)
28 See Duarte and Wolman (2003) for an analysis of the implications of using ﬁscal policy
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within the Euro area have increased since countries lost monetary indepen-
dence and were no longer required to attain inﬂation convergence. Inﬂation
dispersion in the Euro area after the common currency was adopted has been
higher than that observed in the United States. Additionally, the variability
of the inﬂation differential with respect to German inﬂation has tended to
increase for most countries since the Euro was adopted.
These observed inﬂation differentials reﬂect both a temporary process
of price level convergence as well as the adjustment to asymmetric country-
speciﬁc shocks. To the extent that the process of price level convergence
is temporary, these differentials, if continued or widened, are bound to start
generating considerable attention, prompting the debate over the criteria to
be met by Euro-area countries and the design and goals of regional policies.
These differentials naturally raise the question of the adequacy of a common
monetary policy for an area composed of heterogeneous constituent countries
and,sinceﬁscalpolicyistheonlytoolavailabletoregionalauthoritiestoaffect
inﬂation, the question of the ability and desirability of using regional ﬁscal
policy to affect regional price differentials.
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